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Abstract
Fertility decline in human populations is an inherent evolutionary puzzle with major demographic, socio-cultural and evo-
lutionary consequences. The individual level predictors of fertility decline are numerous, but the way these effects vary by 
country and how they are causally mediated by other factors has received relatively little attention. Here we take a multi-
level approach to compare similarities and differences in the primary predictors of contemporary fertility declines—wealth 
and education—across 45 countries in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East using 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data collected from 2003 to 2015. We use multilevel models to understand variation 
in the slopes of these predictors on fertility, and structural equation models to examine the causal pathways by which they 
take their effects, focusing on four mediating variables: local mortality and birth rates, women’s work status, and contracep-
tive use. We find that associations between wealth and fertility differ substantially across populations, while associations 
between education and fertility are consistently negative. The mediators also vary: community-level birth rates and women’s 
contraceptive use are important mediators between education, wealth and the number of children born across a wide variety 
of countries, but community-level mortality rates and women’s work status are not. We discuss our results in the context of 
different causal pathways that reflect cultural and biological evolutionary dynamics as simultaneous and interacting drivers 
of fertility decline.
Keywords Demographic transition · Demographic and health surveys · Education · Evolutionary demography
Introduction
One of the biggest puzzles in human evolutionary demog-
raphy is the dramatic reduction in fertility that has occurred 
during the demographic transition. Fertility decline began 
in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century France and 
has occurred (or is underway) throughout the rest of the 
world (Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Chesnais 1992). 
Given that evolutionary theory predicts that organisms 
should maximize their reproductive success, why are people 
curtailing their fertility to such a dramatic degree (Vining 
1986; Kaplan 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Mace 2014; 
Colleran 2016)?
There is a fairly clear negative relationship between 
wealth and fertility rates across countries (Myrskylä et al. 
2009; Lutz and Samir 2011). Judging by population level 
measures including gross domestic product (GDP) and 
human development index (HDI), wealthier countries, 
broadly speaking, have lower fertility (Myrskylä et al. 2009). 
It is often assumed that this pattern of high wealth and low 
fertility is replicated within countries. And while in West-
ern populations, wealthier and higher status people (particu-
larly women) tend to have relatively lower fertility (Vining 
1986; Kaplan et al. 2002), there is clear evidence that this 
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is not always the case (Clark and Hamilton 2007; Dribe and 
Scalone 2014).
Evolutionary demographers study variation in fertility 
decline to understand how and why people choose lower 
than optimal fertility in modern contexts. The field has long 
been interested in the reasons why wealth has a positive 
association with fertility in most small-scaled and less-
market-integrated populations but a negative relationship 
in large scale market based ones (Kaplan 1996; Mace 1998; 
Hill and Reeve 2005). This puzzle arises because like all 
animals, humans are assumed to have translated increased 
resources into increased reproductive output for most of 
their history. Within most small-scale subsistence econo-
mies, wealthier people tend to have higher fertility. Where 
wealth comes primarily in the form of food energy, there is 
a strong association between wealth and reproductive physi-
ology: those with more wealth have shorter birth intervals, 
greater reproductive success, and improved child survivor-
ship (Kaplan et al. 2002). Where wealth is accumulated 
through goods, objects, and materials (sometimes described 
as ‘extra-somatic wealth’), this wealth (particularly for men) 
is often associated with greater reproductive output (Chag-
non 1979; Flinn 1986; Cronk 1991; Borgerhoff Mulder and 
Beheim 2011).
The reasons for a ‘switch’ in the direction of wealth-fertil-
ity relationships are still unclear: how do reproductive incen-
tives change as populations become more market oriented 
and integrated? And to what extent are these differentially 
aligned with economic considerations and changing cultural 
values about reproduction (Kirk 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder 
1998; Shenk et al. 2013; Colleran 2016)?
Low-fertility strategies apparently depend on fundamen-
tal changes in the prevailing economic system in the course 
of the subsistence transitions that accompany market inte-
gration and economic development, including changes in the 
types of wealth and status that matter for socio-economic 
success as well as levels of inequality (Colleran et al. 2014; 
Shenk et al. 2016), change in inheritance and migration 
patterns (Colleran 2014), social networks (Madhavan et al. 
2003; Colleran et al. 2014) and kin interactions (Newson 
et al. 2005; Mace and Colleran 2009; Colleran and Mace 
2015). But the mechanisms driving the change and the extent 
to which cultural and economic patterns coevolve in the 
process remains a major source of contention (Borgerhoff 
Mulder 1998; Shenk et al. 2013; Snopkowski and Kaplan 
2014; Colleran 2016; Stulp and Barrett 2016). Certainly, 
wealth-generating and wealth-valuing systems differ across 
subsistence types and cultures. This means that the very 
meaning of wealth, its uses, economic relevance, cultural 
value, and the expectations about how it is appropriately 
used differ depending on a wide range of factors that may 
be poorly approximated by the measures designed to capture 
economic development across cultures (e.g., Human Devel-
opment Index, Gross Domestic Product).
The negative relationship that emerges in the course of 
demographic transition defies a straightforward evolutionary 
explanation of reproductive decision-making as the outcome 
of a fitness-maximizing psychology (Perussé 1993; Borger-
hoff Mulder 1998; Low et al. 2002; Alvergne and Lummaa 
2014; Colleran 2016). Previous work has clearly shown that 
individuals who have more children in one generation tend 
to have more descendants in subsequent generations (Kaplan 
et al. 1995; Mueller 2001; Goodman et al. 2012). Contem-
porary high-investing, low-fertility reproductive strategies 
do not appear to maximize reproductive success over any 
time span that has yet been studied (Kaplan et al. 1995; 
Low et al. 2002; Goodman et al. 2012). Yet, despite wide-
spread interest in the factors that may alter the direction of 
the relationship between wealth and fertility, little research 
has examined this question cross-culturally as opposed to 
examining variation at the regional or community level 
(Low and Clarke 1991; Alvergne and Lummaa 2014; Col-
leran et al. 2015). An important cross-cultural contribution 
by Skirbekk (2008) examined broad fertility-status trends 
over a large array of populations through time, covering a 
time span of over 700 years. This impressive study was able 
to show that there is a switch in fertility differentials between 
high and low status individuals over time (as measured by 
social class or occupational status): high status individu-
als switch from having relatively higher fertility to having 
relatively lower fertility. This work grouped together both 
educational and income/wealth measures as a general proxy 
for status. The overall negative relationship between status 
and fertility was mainly driven by education differentials, 
which have had more consistent negative associations with 
fertility than either wealth or income for as long as education 
has been available (Skirbekk 2008). Collapsing wealth and 
status into a single parameter is an important limitation from 
the perspective of evolutionary behavioural scientists, who 
often conceptualise wealth and status as different param-
eters (Hopcroft 2006; von Rueden et al. 2008; Huber et al. 
2010; Bowles et al. 2010; Borgerhoff Mulder and Beheim 
2011; Colleran et al. 2015), broadly construing wealth as 
‘resources’ and status as ‘access to resources’. Moreover, 
while it is often argued that wealth is a multidimensional 
construct (Braveman et al. 2005; von Rueden et al. 2008; 
Colleran et al. 2015) with a great deal more uncertainty in 
its measurement and effects on fertility than for education [in 
particular women’s education (Lutz and Samir 2011; Lutz 
and Skirbekk 2013)], in fact education is also multidimen-
sional in its effects (Basu 2002; Colleran et al. 2014; Snop-
kowski and Kaplan 2014). Among other things, education 
can be considered to confer social and economic status, to 
represent a body of knowledge altering women’s ability to 
control both reproduction and mortality (Bicego and Boerma 
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1993; Glewwe 1999; Pena et al. 2000), or to proxy access to 
economic and social opportunities and information. Conse-
quently, it is increasingly debatable whether the association 
between education and fertility is directly causal or mediated 
by other factors (Lutz and Skirbekk 2013; Snopkowski et al. 
2016; Tropf and Mandemakers 2017).
In this paper we use multilevel models to understand vari-
ation in the slopes of these predictors on fertility, and struc-
tural equation models to examine the likely causal pathways 
by which they take their effects. While we cannot match the 
scope of the data presented in Skirbekk (2008), we address 
important limitations of this previous work; (1) a consist-
ent, standardised measure of wealth that can be directly 
compared across populations; (2) use of covariates allow-
ing statistical ‘control’ of other well-established predictors 
of fertility decline; (3) an explicit multilevel approach that 
captures the cross-cultural structure in the data and which 
can handle varying relationships between wealth, education 
and fertility by population; (4) use of a structural equation 
model to identify the mediators of education and wealth 
on fertility, and (5) an assessment of whether these pos-
sible mediators are cross-culturally consistent. Our analysis 
therefore combines the strength of multilevel varying slope 
models with structural equation models enabling us to see 
the path-dependence of these overall effects.
We treat wealth and education as separate conceptual ele-
ments in the process of fertility decline, which has impor-
tant analytical implications. In previous work, we have 
argued that educational status is likely to influence whether 
increased wealth is translated into higher or lower fertility 
(Colleran et al. 2015). In other words, education is claimed 
to causally determine the effect of wealth on reproductive 
output (without, of course, being mutually exclusive, since 
there will always be feedback between them). Increasingly, 
educational effects on fertility are argued to be a proxy for 
broader contextual, cultural or familial effects (Colleran et al. 
2014; Tropf and Mandemakers 2017) which further supports 
the distinction we advocate. It also means that we must do 
more to understand the proximate mechanisms by which 
education and wealth achieve their effects on fertility, to get 
a closer approximation of the underlying causal structure 
of fertility decline (Snopkowski et al. 2016). Earlier work 
has used standard regression techniques to examine inter-
correlations between different predictors of fertility (Mar-
tin and Juarez 1995); our approach uses structural equation 
modelling to more explicitly examine the various pathways 
by which education and wealth may influence fertility in dif-
ferent contexts. In previous work, we found that the effects 
of wealth and education differed substantially between 22 
different communities of a small-scale farming population 
in rural Poland (Colleran et al. 2015). We also examined the 
path-dependence of educational effects on fertility in three 
different populations for which comparable anthropological 
data were available (Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014; Snop-
kowski et al. 2016). We found that education influenced fer-
tility outcomes (both age at first birth and number of births) 
via several different pathways—although these paths var-
ied by population. For example, education was associated 
with reductions in fertility via increases in women’s labour 
force participation in Poland, but employment did not have 
this mediating effect in Matlab, Bangladesh and San Borja, 
Bolivia. Here, we extend these approaches across 45 coun-
tries in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Central and South 
America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.
We examine four likely mediators of educational and 
wealth effects on fertility at both the community and indi-
vidual level: child mortality and birth rates in a woman’s 
local community, women’s labour force participation, and 
women’s contraceptive use. While there are other vari-
ables that might have explanatory value in our models, 
we selected these variables because they are associated 
with clear directional hypotheses, were available across 
our surveys and allowed us to minimize exclusion of sub-
jects due to missing information. For instance, if we had 
included information related to the husband, we would 
have to exclude single, divorced, and widowed women.
There are several ways that each of our candidate 
mediators may channel how wealth and education are 
associated with fertility. First, purely biologically, child 
mortality terminates breastfeeding and increases the ‘risk’ 
that another child will be conceived, increasing fertility 
rates when infant mortality is high and thus potentially 
exacerbating mortality rates too. Second, parents may 
‘replace’ children who die in line with their own or a 
locally desired family size and/or as ‘insurance’ against 
the possibility of future child deaths or support in older 
age, again more common in areas with high child mortality 
(Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999). These ‘risks’ and incen-
tives, which may largely result from exogenous factors 
affecting mortality, could alter the payoffs to translating 
wealth or educational status into children. Interestingly, 
while reduced child mortality is usually observed prior 
to fertility declines (Mason 1997) and is widely assumed 
to be an essential prerequisite to fertility change (Doepke 
2005; Dyson 2010), empirical evidence actually suggests 
that the effect of changing child mortality rates on fertility 
is relatively small (Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999). Local 
fertility rates in turn can influence women’s reproductive 
output by providing information about locally appropriate 
reproductive behaviour including the conditions for repro-
duction, and/or incentives to, or constraints on, higher or 
lower fertility through social transmission. The cultural 
transmission of ideas, norms, and information is of course 
also influential in one’s fertility decision-making (Cleland 
and Wilson 1987; Colleran 2016), especially since indi-
viduals may look to others in their local networks and 
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communities to determine appropriate reproductive strate-
gies (Behrman and Watkins 2001; Behrman et al. 2002; 
Alvergne et al. 2011; Colleran et al. 2014; Snopkowski and 
Kaplan 2014; Colleran and Mace 2015).
Women’s labour force participation may mediate how 
wealth or education influences fertility outcomes by creating 
time-constraints on childbearing such that working women 
are less likely to have additional children (Ermisch 1989; 
Hoem and Hoem 1989) or through increasing women’s 
decision-making autonomy, which may reveal underlying 
preferences for lower fertility (Dyson and Moore 1983; but 
see Moya et al. 2016). Contraceptive use is another possible 
mediator we examine in our models because its relation-
ship with both wealth and education has been the subject 
of much research (Ainsworth et al. 1996; McNay et al. 
2003; Cleland et al. 2006; Bongaarts 2008). While educa-
tion likely improves information about contraceptives and 
wealth appears to increase access to them (Mace and Col-
leran 2009; Alvergne et al. 2011), previous research in high-
fertility contexts has found a positive relationship between 
contraceptive use and fertility, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where women who have had many children and want 
to end their reproductive careers or space future births are 
often the ones most likely to use contraceptives (Caldwell 
and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al. 1994; Mace and Colleran 
2009; Alvergne et al. 2013).
Methods
We use available data from the standard demographic and 
health surveys (DHS) that met the following criteria: (1) 
the country was experiencing fertility decline at the time 
the survey was conducted (assessed through examining 
total fertility rates (TFR) the year before and after the sur-
vey from https ://ourwo rldin data.org/ferti lity), (2) the survey 
was collected using the questionnaire recode IV through VII 
(earlier surveys did not include the wealth index score we 
use), and (3) the survey results are publically available. DHS 
surveys are only carried out in less-developed countries or 
countries receiving US foreign aid. Countries are surveyed 
repeatedly, and we examine all applicable survey waves for 
each country (http://www.dhspr ogram .com/). Thirty-six of 
our sampled countries had multiple waves of data (ranging 
from two to four waves), generating a total of 85 survey 
waves that included the necessary variables. The maximum 
number of waves within a country is four (Bangladesh) but 
the most common number is two. Given that we compare 
across countries and within-countries, we have two data-
sets: (1) a sample of 45 countries with one wave of data 
per country [the most recent survey completed; n = 803,426; 
see Table S1 in Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM)] 
and (2) a sample of 85 survey waves in 36 countries that 
include countries with at least two cross-sectional waves in 
two different years (Table S2 in ESM). Figure 1 displays the 
sampled countries colour coded by total fertility rate (TFR) 
at the time of the most recent survey and an indication of 
Fig. 1  Map of countries included in analysis. Darker colours repre-
sent higher TFR’s at the time of the most recent  survey. Stars rep-
resent countries where multiple waves of data were collected, while 
triangles represent countries surveyed once. Mapping publishing plat-
form credit to: Harvard WorldMap http://world map.harva rd.edu
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whether the country contributed multiple waves of data. The 
surveys were collected between 2003 and 2015 and range 
in total fertility rates (at the time of the survey) from 2.15 
(Bangladesh in 2015) to 7.6 (Niger in 2006). Women aged 
15–49 were interviewed about their reproductive and marital 
histories. In 41 countries, women were interviewed regard-
less of marital status, while in four countries (Egypt, Jordan, 
the Maldives, and Pakistan) only ever-married women were 
included (along with Indonesia’s 2007 wave). We include all 
women for whom the necessary data were available in our 
analyses, to capture reproduction outside as well as inside 
marriage. We therefore do not restrict our analyses to mar-
ried women only.
We use the measures of wealth and education created by 
the DHS. The DHS wealth index is a composite measure of 
household wealth including information on: the household’s 
water supply, sanitation facilities, floor type; whether the 
household has electricity, a domestic servant, owns agricul-
tural land, a television, a vehicle (and type); and the num-
ber of people per sleeping room. The index is constructed 
using Principal Component Analysis (Rutstein and Johnson 
2004) and details for each survey can be found here: http://
www.dhspr ogram .com/topic s/wealt h-index /Wealt h-Index 
-Const ructi on.cfm. Education is defined as the education 
of the woman in single years and varies from an average 
of 1.8 years in Burkina-Faso to 10.9 years in Jordan. We 
standardised these measures of wealth and education within 
countries to have a mean of 0 and SD of approximately 1 
(in the majority of countries the wealth index was already 
standardised). This allows us to directly compare the pre-
dicted effect of a 1 SD increase in wealth and education 
on fertility across different countries, while allowing wealth 
and education to have country-specific meanings. Standard-
ising within country (i.e., group-mean centring) means that 
we measure wealth and education relative to the country 
of the individual, not on an absolute scale across all coun-
tries. It also means that computational models are more 
likely to converge. For comparison we also ran our analy-
sis using untransformed versions of these variables across 
the 45 countries. We ran all our analyses on two different 
dependent variables: “number of births” and “number of 
living children”, which we use as measures of ‘fertility’. Our 
results do not differ substantially by outcome variable. We 
therefore report only models using the number of live births 
as the dependent variable. This measures the total number 
of children ever born and includes children who were born 
alive but later died but excludes pregnancies that resulted in 
a miscarriage, abortion or stillbirth. Full details for both out-
comes are reported in the supplementary materials (Tables 
S3–S10). We also report our results based on standardised 
variables. Again, full details of the unstandardised models 
are available in the supplementary materials (Tables S5, S6, 
S9, S10).
Our analysis involves multilevel and standard Poisson 
regression and structural equation modelling (SEM) tech-
niques, which respectively take care of the non-independ-
ence of individuals within countries and the mediators of the 
relationships between wealth, education and fertility. The 
multilevel analysis replicates the analysis strategy described 
in Colleran et al. (2015). Here we explicitly compare the 
varying effects of wealth and education on fertility across 
the subsample of 45 countries with one wave each. We then 
assess whether there is variation between different survey 
waves within those 36 countries that had multiple waves 
of data, using standard (i.e., not multilevel) Poisson regres-
sion techniques. In other words, we ran a separate Poisson 
regression model for each wave of data (85 waves from 36 
different countries). All regression models control for age 
and  age2, work status, contraceptive use, and community 
level mortality and fertility rates. All data handling and mul-
tilevel analysis was carried out in R v.3.12 (R Core Team 
2014) using the ‘lme4’ (Bates et al. 2012), ‘blme’ (Dorie 
2013) and ‘languageR’ (Baayen 2011) packages. ‘lme4’ has 
known convergence issues with large datasets (Bates et al. 
2012) so we follow the developers’ guidelines on scaling and 
standardising variables as well as using a range of optimisers 
to aid and assess convergence.
We then develop comparative SEMs across all 45 coun-
tries using the maximum likelihood with missing values 
method in STATA (v. 13), using a similar analysis strategy 
as found in Snopkowski et al. (2016). All SEM models test 
a model where education and wealth independently predict 
community-level mortality and fertility, women’s work sta-
tus, and contraceptive use, which in turn, influence number 
of live births. Age is included as a predictor of all individual-
level variables. Wealth and education also have direct paths 
to the number of live births to determine the direct effect 
of these variables after controlling for likely mediators. A 
visual representation of this structural equation model (also 
Fig. 2  The hypothesised structural equation model used to analyse 
the mediating pathways from both education and wealth to the num-
ber of births
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known as a path model) can be seen in Fig. 2. While we pre-
sent these models as a series of directed paths, SEM cannot 
demonstrate causality and all results should be interpreted 
as correlations.
Community-level variables are calculated at the cluster 
level; the smallest geographical survey unit for DHS surveys. 
Clusters consist of a number of adjacent households in a 
geographical area. In urban areas, this may be a city block, 
while in rural areas this may be a village, a part of a village, 
or a group of small villages (ICF International 2012). Com-
munity-level mortality is defined as the number of children 
who died divided by the number of live births of surveyed 
women (aged 15–49) within the cluster. Community-level 
fertility is defined as the average birth residual controlling 
for age within the cluster, calculated by fitting a linear model 
of number of births by age for each country, calculating the 
residual for each woman and taking the average residual for 
all surveyed women per cluster. Communities with higher 
average residuals have higher fertility (controlling for age) 
than the overall average for their country. Women’s work 
status is an ordinal variable measured as no work in the 
past year (represented by 0), works occasionally (1), works 
seasonally (2), and works all year (3). In the SEMs, we treat 
this variable as continuous and interpret it as analogous to 
the intensiveness of a woman’s labour-force participation. 
Finally, contraceptive use is an ordinal variable in the multi-
level models measured as no contraceptive use (0), tradi-
tional method of contraceptive use (1), and modern method 
of contraceptive use (2). In the SEMs this was included as a 
binary variable (no method versus any method).
Results
The association between wealth and fertility varies 
greatly by country, but education’s relationship 
with fertility is consistently negative
We find that the association between wealth and fertility 
varies qualitatively as well as quantitatively by country 
(Fig. 3a), but the association between education and fertility 
is universally negative (Fig. 3b). A 1 SD increase in wealth, 
relative to other people in the country, is associated with a 
range of reproductive outcomes, from a 12% decrease in 
fertility in the Philippines  [eβ = 0.88, β = −0.13, 95% CI(β) 
(− 0.12, − 0.14)], β, regression coefficient, CI, confidence 
interval, (see Table S3 in ESM) to a 3% increase in fertility 
in Niger  [eβ = 1.03, β = 0.03, 95% CI(β) (0.04, 0.01)], though 
flatter slopes in many countries indicate that the relationship 
is not always strong. These values must be understood in the 
context of the range of standard deviations in a particular 
country (see Tables S3 and S4 in ESM): these coefficients 
translate into widely varying outcomes across countries.
For education the relationships are less varied. A 1 SD 
increase in education, relative to other people in the country, 
is associated with a 27% decrease in fertility in Comoros 
 [eβ = 0.73, β = − 0.31, 95% CI(β) (− 0.29, − 0.34)] to a 4% 
decrease in fertility in Egypt  [eβ = 0.96, β = − 0.04, 95% 
CI(β) (− 0.03, − 0.05), see Table S4 in ESM]. The results 
are qualitatively comparable when we use unstandardised 
variables, i.e., treating a 1-year increment in schooling as 
the unit of measurement instead of 1 SD (Tables S5 and S6 
in ESM). So a 1-year increase in schooling is associated 
a b c
Fig. 3  Varying slopes of a wealth and b education on fertility across 
the 45 countries represented by the DHS data. Plots show the mar-
ginal (model-adjusted) regression slope of each variable in each 
country as produced by the multilevel models, with different coun-
tries represented by coloured lines. The black dashed lines show the 
predicted averaged or ‘fixed’ effect, i.e., the association between 
wealth or education and fertility when the slopes are not allowed to 
vary. Note that the variables are centred on zero, which represents 
the mean value of wealth or education within a particular country. A 
one-unit interval on the x-axis represents a standard deviation in the 
predictor variable. c Interaction between wealth and education. Here 
each line represents the relationship between wealth and fertility for 
a particular point on the scale of education. The numbers attached to 
each line represent the exact point on the scale of relative education
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with a 29% decrease in fertility among women living in 
the Comoros, where years of schooling range from 0 to 20, 
whereas a 1-year increase in schooling is associated with a 
4% decrease in fertility in Egypt, which is comparable to 
the estimate from the standardised model, where the range 
of education is 0–23 years.
We argued that the education level of an individual 
could alter how wealth influences fertility. In support of this 
hypothesis, we find a significant interaction overall between 
wealth and education (Fig. 3c), suggesting that these two 
variables should not be understood in isolation from each 
other when considering fertility differentials. For every 1 
SD increase in education, the association between wealth 
and fertility is on average 3% more negative  [eβ = 0.97, 
β = − 0.029, 95% CI(β) (− 0.027, − 0.03)]. Taking the quin-
tiles displayed in Fig. 3c as an example, this interaction 
implies that among women with the highest levels of edu-
cation, more wealth is translated into fewer children. The 
opposite is the case for women with the lowest levels of 
education: more wealth is translated into more children.
Wealth has a more positive effect in high fertility 
regimes
Figure 4a shows that in countries with high total fertility 
rates, the relationship between wealth and fertility within a 
country tends to be positive, other things equal, whereas in 
countries with relatively low TFRs, the relationship between 
wealth and fertility is more negative. This variation prob-
ably represents points on a continuum of economic devel-
opment but also socio-cultural variation that regulates the 
overall way that wealth is associated with fertility. Notably, 
although countries located in sub-Saharan Africa are clus-
tered together at the higher end of the distribution of TFR, 
there is also very clear variation between these countries in 
how wealth is associated with fertility. In contrast, the rela-
tionship between education and fertility, shown in Fig. 4b, 
is more consistent across countries, in most cases having a 
small negative association. These results are consistent with 
those found by Skirbekk (2008). The interaction between 
wealth and education does not itself appear to vary substan-
tially by country.
Within‑countries, the effects vary over time, 
but not consistently
Our Poisson regression analyses of each wave of data within 
the 36 countries for which multiple waves were available 
indicate little variation in the magnitude of the associations 
between wealth, education and fertility in different survey 
years, though the patterns are not consistent across coun-
tries. In some countries, for example Ghana (3 waves), the 
association between education and fertility is more negative 
in later survey years than it is in earlier ones, indicating 
somewhat steeper negative slopes of wealth and educa-
tion on fertility as the overall fertility rate declines. A 1 SD 
increase in education was associated with a 9%  [eβ = 0.91, 
β = − 0.09, 95% CI(β) (− 0.11, − 0.07)] decrease in fer-
tility in 2003 when the TFR was 4.51, a 14%  [eβ = 0.86, 
β = − 0.15, 95% CI(β) (− 0.17, − 0.13)] decrease in 2008 
when the TFR was 4.19 and a 13%  [eβ = 0.87, β = − 0.14, 
95% CI(β) (− 0.16,− 0.13)] decrease in 2014 when the TFR 
was 3.79. The corresponding measures for wealth, which 
do not vary substantially across years, are a 7%  [eβ = 0.93, 
a b
Fig. 4  Varying beta coefficients (± SE) of a wealth and b education 
on fertility, shown in order of contemporary total fertility rates and 
colour-coded to represent different macro-regions. Note that the sign 
of the beta coefficients for the correlation between wealth and fertility 
spans both positive and negative values, whereas the corresponding 
beta coefficients for education are always negative
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β = − 0.07, 95% CI(β) (− 0.10, − 0.04)] decrease in fertil-
ity in 2003, a 3%  [eβ = 0.97, β = − 0.03, 95% CI(β) (− 0.06, 
− 0.01)] decrease in 2008 and a 6%  [eβ = 0.94, β = − 0.06, 
95% CI(β) (− 0.08, − 0.04)] decrease in 2014. These results 
are comparable when using number of living children as the 
outcome of interest (see Figs. S3 and S4 in ESM).
In other countries, such as Bangladesh [which has the 
most (four) waves of data], the estimated slopes are com-
parable in different years, indicating very modest changes 
over time. There, a 1 SD increase in wealth was associated 
with a 1%  [eβ = 0.99, β = − 0.01, 95% CI(β) (− 0.02, 0.00)] 
decrease in fertility in 2004 when the TFR was 2.7, a 3% 
 [eβ = 0.97, β = − 0.03, 95% CI(β) (− 0.05, − 0.02)] decrease 
in 2007 when the TFR was 2.44, a 1%  [eβ = 0.99, β = − 0.01, 
95% CI(β) (− 0.02, 0.00)] decrease in 2011 when the TFR 
was 2.24 and a 2%  [eβ = 0.98, β = − 0.02, 95% CI(β) (− 0.03, 
− 0.01)] decrease in 2014 when the TFR was 2.15. The cor-
responding measures for education are an 11%  [eβ = 0.89, 
β = − 0.12, 95% CI(β) (− 0.13, − 0.10)] decrease in fertility 
in 2004, a 10%  [eβ = 0.90, β = − 0.11, 95% CI(β) (− 0.12, 
− 0.09)] decrease in 2007, a 10%  [eβ = 0.90, β = − 0.11, 95% 
CI(β) (− 0.12, − 0.09)] decrease in 2011 and a 9%  [eβ = 0.91, 
β = − 0.09, 95% CI(β) (− 0.10, − 0.08)] decrease in 2014.
Since most countries have only two waves of data, it 
is difficult to determine significant variation in these esti-
mates with much confidence, or to put forward any strong 
claims about the cross-cultural variations in this pattern-
ing across time. However it does suggest that the cross-sec-
tional between-country differences we observe above are 
larger than the within-country differences over the available 
time-spans.
A linear regression shows that TFR accounts for about 
20% of the variation in the wealth coefficients (adjusted 
R2 = 0.20), with a one unit increase in TFR associated with 
about a 1% [β = 0.012, 95% CI(β) (0.01, 0.02)] increase 
in the magnitude of the association (i.e., becoming more 
positive in the association with fertility). Other macro-level 
predictors such as GDP (measured both in US dollars and 
purchasing power parity) are neither correlated with the 
wealth coefficients nor account for much variance (adjusted 
R2 < 0.03). We do not observe any comparable correlations 
between TFR or GDP and the education coefficients (Fig. 5).
Both wealth and education affect the hypothesised 
mediators of fertility in similar ways—except 
for women’s work status
Figure 6 displays the structural equation model that was exe-
cuted for each country, where each pathway is designated by 
the proportion of countries that have either a positive (pink, 
solid line), negative (blue, dashed line) or non-significant 
effect (black dotted line) for the given relationship, and 
where the thickness of the line indicates the proportion of 
countries where that effect was found. Each line is labelled 
with the percentage of countries where a statistically signifi-
cant association was found followed by a symbol to repre-
sent the direction of the association. For example, the rela-
tionship between education and contraceptive use is positive 
in the majority (80%) of counties. The remaining 20% of 
countries either exhibited significant negative associations 
or non-significant trends. Details for each country (including 
fit statistics) can be found in Table S11 in ESM.
Consistent with the multilevel models, education has a 
consistent negative association with total number of live 
births (significant in all 45 countries) net of controls whereas 
wealth varies by country: in 55% of countries there is a sig-
nificantly negative association, in 16% there is a significantly 
positive association, and in the rest there is no significant 
association. Both wealth and education are significantly 
negatively associated with community-level child mortality 
and birth rates and significantly positively associated with 
contraceptive use in the vast majority of countries.
But there are some important differences. Wealth is more 
consistently associated with women’s intensity of labour-
force participation across countries than is education. Fig-
ure 7a displays these differences across countries. Women 
in wealthier households tend to work less in over 80% of 
countries. Women with more education tend to work more 
in 50% of countries, but in 30% of countries they work less, 
and in the remaining 20% of countries, education is not sig-
nificantly associated with women’s work status (see Fig. 7b). 
This pattern seems to be driven by differences between high 
and low fertility countries. Among the subset of relatively 
lower-fertility countries (those with TFRs ≤ 3), education 
is positively associated with intensiveness of labour-force 
participation (or has no effect in India). In higher-fertility 
countries (particularly those with TFRs > 4.5), the associa-
tion between education and labour market participation is 
highly variable: more countries exhibit a negative associa-
tion between education and women’s work status than a posi-
tive one.
Contraceptive use and local birth rates, 
but not mortality or work status, have independent 
associations with fertility in the majority 
of countries
Both contraceptive use and community-level birth rate are 
significantly positively associated with fertility in more than 
95% of countries surveyed. This pattern for contraceptive 
use is in line with much research in sub-Saharan Africa 
showing that women who have many children are often more 
likely to adopt contraceptives, but it is surprising to see that 
this association is also widespread outside of this region.
On the other hand, community-level child mortality rate 
appears to have little direct effect on the number of children 
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being born (as opposed to the number of children remain-
ing alive) despite being widely hypothesised to influence 
fertility outcomes. While in 100% of surveys, there is a 
significant negative relationship between community-level 
mortality and number of living children (see Table S12 in 
ESM), in 75% of countries there is no association between 
community-level child mortality and number of live births. 
The remaining 25% of countries are split between significant 
positive or negative associations (Fig. 8a). For instance, Mali 
had an estimated under-5 mortality rate of 11.5% in 2016 
(World Bank 2017), but community-level child mortality 
was not associated with the number of live births in our 
analysis. This seemingly paradoxical result suggests that 
mortality rates (at least as we have operationalized them 
here, see “Methods”) have little direct impact on actual 
birth rates across less-developed countries, though they are 
of course strongly associated with the number of children 
that survive.
Also surprising was the finding that in 45% of countries, 
women’s work had no association with fertility. Where there 
is a significant association it tends to be negative (39% of 
countries). Again we see a difference between low and 
high fertility regimes: in countries with low TFRs, working 
women tend to have fewer live births, while in countries with 
higher TFRs, women’s work status has no association with 
their fertility (see Fig. 8b).
Fig. 5  Beta coefficients (± SE) 
of a wealth and b education 
on fertility for all 85 waves in 
the 36 countries. Coefficients 
are colour-coded by coun-
try, with survey years indicated 
by the adjacent numbers. Note 
again that the sign of the beta 
coefficients for wealth spans 
both positive and negative 
values (a), whereas the cor-
responding beta coefficients 
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Within‑country surveys show some pathways 
change consistently through time
There are 12 countries where surveys were collected three 
(or more) times over approximately 10  years (refer to 
Table S2 in ESM for details). This allows us to determine if 
and how the paths change over time. The full results of these 
path analyses can be found in Table S13 in ESM. One of the 
most consistent changes is the path between age and num-
ber of births. Not surprisingly, as fertility is reduced (which 
is occurring in every country included in our survey), the 
effect size of age on number of births shrinks (see Fig. 9). 
The magnitude of the association between these variables 
is decreasing over time. The opposite is true for education. 
As women have fewer children the magnitude of the nega-
tive association between women’s education and number of 
births gets larger. This is happening in 75% of the countries 
we analysed.
The paths between both wealth and education and con-
traceptive use are generally positive (see Fig. 6). Wealth-
ier and more highly educated individuals are more likely 
to use contraceptives, but the size of the effect tends to be 
reduced across time in 7 of 12 countries we examined, pos-
sibly reflecting the diffusion of contraceptive practices over 
Fig. 6  The structural equation model (SEM) that was executed for 
each country, where each pathway represents the proportion of coun-
tries that have either a positive (pink, solid line), negative (blue, 
dashed line) or non-significant effect (black dotted line) for the given 
relationship, and where the thickness of the line indicates the propor-
tion of countries where that effect was found (note that only the most 
frequent effect is indicated)
a b
Fig. 7  The structural equation model (see Fig. 6) standardised effect 
size of a wealth and b education on women’s work by country. Coun-
tries are ordered from lowest TFR (at the top) to highest TFR (at the 
bottom). ES represents “Effect size” with 95% confidence intervals. 
The area of the grey box is proportional to the weight of the country 
in determining the overall effect, which is represented by the diamond 
and dashed vertical line. The solid vertical line represents the null 
effect (effect = 0)
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time (see Fig. 9). Again, the size of the association between 
education and women’s labour force participation tends to 
increase with time. This suggests that as fertility declines, 
more educated women are more likely to participate in the 
labour force, mirroring our earlier results. We do not observe 
any consistent change in the association between women’s 
labour force participation and number of births across the 
10-year period covered by the data in most (9) of the coun-
tries. This contrasts with the cross-country pattern, where 
negative associations between labour-force participation and 
number of births tend to emerge in low fertility contexts.
Discussion
It seems obvious that the predictors and mediators of fertil-
ity decline will vary in direction and relative magnitude, 
according to population-level variation, but there is currently 
a lack of multivariate cross-cultural comparison in different 
economic and ecological settings to demonstrate this. Our 
results demonstrate that women’s education and wealth are 
both important predictors of fertility, but when examined 
separately, it is clear that they have differing effects on fer-
tility and interact with each other. Across all 45 countries 
a b
Fig. 8  The structural equation model (see Fig. 6) standardised effect 
of a community-level children’s mortality and b women’s work on 
number of live births by country. Countries are ordered from lowest 
TFR (at the top) to the highest TFR (at the bottom). ES represents 
“Effect size” with 95% confidence intervals. The area of the grey box 
is proportional to the weight of the country in determining the overall 
effect, which is represented by the diamond and dashed vertical line. 
The solid vertical line represents the null effect (effect = 0)
u
Fig. 9  The structural equation model (SEM) that was executed for 
countries that have three or more waves of data collection (n = 12; for 
full results, see Table S13 in ESM). Each pathway represents the pro-
portion of countries (out of twelve) that have an increasing effect size 
over time (green line), a decreasing effect size over time (red line) or 
inconsistent effect/no change in effect over time (black dotted line) for 
the given association. It is also indicated (in parentheses) whether the 
association is becoming more negative, less negative, more positive, 
or less positive if that effect is consistent. (Note that only the most 
frequent effect is indicated)
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analysed, a negative association between education and fer-
tility is evident after controlling for other variables, includ-
ing wealth. But the association between wealth and fertility 
is much more variable: it is positive in many high-fertility 
countries, but negative in many low-fertility countries. Given 
that education and wealth are usually at least somewhat posi-
tively correlated, the positive effects of wealth on fertility 
may only be observeable when the effect of education is 
controlled for. Historical and non-European fertility declines 
indicate that the characterisation of rich families reducing 
their fertility first in a demographic transition may not be 
completely accurate (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Dribe and 
Scalone 2014). Taking into account the multidimensional-
ity of wealth and status may help to address these questions 
more fully in the future.
Skirbekk (2008) documented a switch in status-fertility 
differentials over time. Based on our models and using more 
directly comparable data across 45 countries, it appears that 
the positive association between wealth and fertility switches 
when countries fall below approximately six births/women. 
Nonetheless, all of the countries we analysed were experi-
encing some level of incipient fertility decline at the time 
of interview.
Moreover, education and wealth interact. Our analyses 
suggest that this interaction is relatively robust across coun-
tries (we did not find that the slope of the interaction var-
ied substantially, result not shown) and shows that among 
women with the highest levels of education, more wealth is 
typically translated into fewer children. The opposite is the 
case for women with the lowest levels of education: more 
wealth is typically translated into more children. This repli-
cates a similar finding at the community level in our previ-
ous work. It also suggests that demographic transitions can 
be conceptualised as transitions in the nature and effects of 
wealth and status (Kaplan 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 
2009; Colleran et al. 2015; Stulp and Barrett 2016).
We examined whether the effects of wealth and education 
on fertility differed over time within 36 countries for which 
there were repeated waves of data collection. While there 
does appear to be some change over time, it is neither sub-
stantial nor consistent across countries. Differences between 
countries seem to be larger than differences between waves 
of data collected within countries. Ultimately, with only 
two time points in most countries the data are insufficient 
to fully explore this question. Longitudinal data, analysed 
on a per-country basis, will undoubtedly shed more light. 
Nonetheless, we can show that the effects of wealth on fer-
tility co-vary with the country-level TFR, but this is not the 
case for education.
Our structural equation models demonstrate that the way 
women’s education and wealth influence the number of chil-
dren born depends partly on both community-level birth 
rates and contraceptive use, but not on community-level 
mortality and women’s work status. Women’s education and 
wealth increase the likelihood of contraceptive use, which in 
turn has a positive association with number of births; those 
using contraceptives have on average, more children. While 
seemingly counter-intuitive, this effect is well known in sub-
Saharan Africa (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al. 
1994; Mace and Colleran 2009; Alvergne et al. 2013), where 
those women who adopt contraceptives are regularly the 
ones who already have many children and want to space or 
limit future births and where cultures of high fertility remain 
strong (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al. 1994; 
Mbacké 2017). Community-level birth rates likely provide 
social information about reproductive decisions, and peo-
ple may adopt the reproductive strategies of others living in 
their community, as we and others have previously found at 
lower levels of aggregation (Kravdal 2012; Colleran et al. 
2014). Since community level data capture the local social 
and economic environments that characterise women’s daily 
lives, the characteristics of neighbours and friends may have 
a larger effect on fertility decline than the same character-
istics at higher levels of aggregation (Kravdal 2012). There 
may also be some selection effect here, as women with more 
education or household wealth are probably less likely to 
live in high fertility areas.
In 75% of countries analysed, community-level mortal-
ity had no discernible association with births despite the 
very large sample sizes (over 800,000 women). While some 
have hypothesised that high mortality rates may have larger 
effects on fertility in high-mortality contexts (Snopkowski 
et al. 2016), we do not observe this pattern in our results. 
It is possible that the type of mortality is very important. 
When mortality is extrinsic (or unpreventable), individu-
als may respond by having additional children, but when 
mortality is intrinsic and can be avoided by particular invest-
ment strategies, we may predict increased investment and/
or fertility as a response to mortality. Unfortunately, even 
with detailed information at the community-level, it is hard 
to determine exactly how much mortality is extrinsic versus 
intrinsic. Future research should explore whether type of 
mortality (or specific causes of mortality) can help explain 
fertility decisions. It is also possible that our measure of 
community-level mortality rate is too coarse since it is only 
based on the women who were surveyed in a given cluster. 
Small variations in local mortality rates may require very 
large samples to be accurately detectable.
Women’s labour-force participation is widely thought to 
be an important mediator of the relationship between wom-
en’s education and fertility (Becker 1981; Ermisch 1989; 
Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014; Snopkowski et al. 2016). 
But greater education increases the intensity of labour-force 
participation in only 50% of the countries surveyed, mainly 
in low fertility contexts. Nonetheless, education appears to 
have an increasingly important association with women’s 
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labour-force participation through time. Conversely, women 
in wealthier households tend to work less, not more, in 83% 
of countries. Women’s work status was the only media-
tor that had qualitatively different mediating associations 
between wealth/education and fertility.
Women’s work status is a poor predictor of total num-
ber of births, but appears more important in low-fertility 
contexts. The association between women’s labour-force 
participation and number of live births is not consistently 
changing across time.
By explicitly examining cross-cultural variation in both 
the overall relationships between key predictors of fertility 
decline and the path-dependence of their effects, we high-
light that the causal structure of fertility decline will differ 
under varying ecological, cultural and economic scenarios. 
This has broad implications for our understanding of the 
kinds of evolutionary trajectories that drive demographic 
change over time and especially highlights that the processes 
themselves may differ depending on the context and the level 
of analysis. The prevailing cultural and economic institu-
tions in different countries will variably influence the way 
that education and wealth provide access to opportunities 
and information for women, making it more or less advanta-
geous to calibrate reproductive strategies to local community 
dynamics instead of macro level ones. For example, gender 
norms directly or indirectly restricting women’s employ-
ment can work against macro-level selective pressures for 
market-oriented skills and investment in embodied capital. 
Cross-cultural differences in ‘tightness’ and ‘looseness’—for 
example, how acceptable deviations from existing norms are, 
how new norms are received and how open the mass media 
and information flows are—could influence cultural trans-
mission dynamics both within and between countries (Gel-
fand et al. 2011). Structural biases in development spending, 
driven by macro-level interactions in international networks, 
could cause some areas to more slowly adapt to changing 
reproductive incentives at the macro-level, or enable them 
to maintain reproductive strategies that are equilibrated to 
the local economy.
There has been considerable debate about whether dif-
ferent predictors of fertility decline represent underlying 
‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ influences on reproduction. Know-
ing more about the inter-correlations between different 
predictors, and in particular how those inter-correlations 
themselves vary across cultures, should help researchers 
develop a better understanding of the causal structure of 
fertility decline that avoids simply prioritising one key vari-
able. One of the strengths of this research is that we are able 
to cross-culturally compare different predictors of fertil-
ity, which provides us with macro-level information about 
the amount of variation in key predictors and mediators of 
fertility decline. Along with this strength comes the disad-
vantages associated with large-scale demographic datasets 
that involve secondary data analysis, including that the 
survey was not collected to answer our specific question, 
that there may be non-response bias associated with such a 
time-intensive survey, and differences in the sampling cri-
teria across countries, for instance, by excluding particular 
groups of women based on marital status (Stulp et al. 2016). 
Additionally, there are many additional structural features of 
these countries that could be built into our models, including 
ethnic, linguistic and religious sub-groupings, region and 
sub-region, which may have important influences on fertility 
behaviour. We ignore these effects for the moment, overlook-
ing the cultural and structured complexity of fertility decline 
within each country in favour of a broader assessment of 
the variation between countries. This is because the number 
and types of such structuring properties vary substantially 
by country and allowing the slopes of wealth and education 
to vary within each of these structures would currently pre-
sent insurmountable difficulties, both computationally and 
in terms of interpreting the resulting variation in a cross-
cultural light. While we are aware that the relationships we 
report here may vary at lower levels of aggregation (Kravdal 
2012; Colleran et al. 2015), these may be better assessed on 
a country-by-country basis that takes this complexity more 
fully into account. Future research will surely examine these 
important aspects in more detail and this study is a first step 
towards quantifying these differences cross-culturally.
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